However, this latter phrase sounds more Nietzschean than Hegelian. However, I can find no textual evidence in Hegel to substantiate the claim that he held the idea of "the eternal recurrence". Moreover, on several occasions you argue that spirit "progresses in a semilinear way modified by detours and regressions" p. Yet I cannot see in the Phenomenology of Spirit itself, or indeed, in any other of Hegel's texts, such as the Science of Logic or the Philosophy of Right, any regression.
Nor is the dialectic an external procedure applied to the subject-matter, as sometimes you seem to suggest — e. Die Wahrheit ist die Bewegung ihrer an ihr selbst". This means that the acquisition of knowledge and the development of the object are interrelated. Related to the argument about the "end of philosophy" and the "end of history" is your view that Hegel was able to foresee future developments — e. Yet Hegel did not claim that he was able to foresee future developments. Rather, according to Hegel, philosophy articulates or encapsulates the spirit of the age, that is, philosophy is comprehension.
As Walter Kaufmann remarked more than fifty years ago, "…a sound critique of Hegel should also take into account his remarkable restraint: he did not attempt to play the prophet and was content to comprehend the past. In saying this, you must assume that the real is somehow beyond us, beyond human experience.
LX October , no. So "consciousness" develops into "spirit"; and inasmuch as the Phenomenology presents this development as necessary it is "science" "Wissenschaft". As Hegel says in the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology: Dieses [i. Therefore, the Phenomenology is an epistemological project, where "epistemology" is meant in a broad sense, i. In this sense, Hegel was an "anti-epistemologist", as he objected to the very idea of a "theory of knowledge". On this see R.
This leads me to your understanding of Hegel's concept of "Geist". This you understand as "the underlying element of their [i. Hegel is a systematic philosopher. True, there are many different ways one can interpret Hegel — and left and right Hegelianism do not exhaust all possible readings. And the Phenomenology of Spirit marked a turning-point in Hegel's development. But this is one thing; it is quite another to argue that "Hegel is Is the idea of an immanent development not characteristic of Hegel's philosophy, for example?
Another disagreement I have with your interpretation of Hegel pertains to Hegel's language. In fact, Hegel wrote prefaces after he had written the text itself. So he could not have used aphorisms "as introductory devices"; if anything, aphorisms summarize — encapsulate — his philosophy. The process of becoming Nor is it accurate to say that this "shock treatment" is "Socratic". For what is Socratic therein?
Socrates according to Plato's dialogues held the view that knowledge could not be imposed on the student from without or inculcated into his mind, but had to be elicited from his mind. The Socratic elenchus aimed to unmask all false beliefs and ideas.
It led to puzzlement; for Socrates, philosophy begins when one learns to doubt question one's cherished beliefs and dogmas — that is, when the mind turns around and examines itself. Therein lies the value of the Socratic elenchus. You maintain that, on the one hand, Hegel "has a strong systematic reason for denying the propriety in philosophical discourse of using the predicative proposition"; but, on the other hand, "he has an equally systematic reason against devising a special, nonnatural language for philosophy.
We cannot know much about the historical Socrates, as he did not write anything. You argue that Hegel's use of aphorisms "may be another device of coping with the antinomy of language", that "These aphorisms are fundamentally self-refuting" and that "what they say contradicts what they are and seem to perform I think that your views about Hegel's philosophical language are inaccurate.
How then can, what is or should be Rousseau says they're the same the goal of society after the French Revolution, everyone participate in the state? This is, I think, the most important human question imaginable besides our historical contingency of climate change, which may force us to answer the above question in a thoroughly dialectically material way! Its solution, as Marx here identifies, as elsewhere many others have, lies in the metaphysical existence of private property, which, in principle, so Marx says, "contradicts the principle of the family"; indeed, I should add that, if it contradicts the genesis of human life in the family, it must undoubtedly contradict its continuance.
Our despoiled environmental and psychological Arizona, Norway; the Right is more popular in democratic polling than ever in history! View all 4 comments. Jan 02, Cent rated it it was amazing. The text is indeed difficult, perhaps because it seems to be on its i guess unedited manuscript form, and hence, there are plenty of repetitions and digressions scattered throughout. In addition, Marx is reacting against the abstruse Hegelian jargon. But the main path Marx took is graspable enough. The state and its constitution is the rational, organically united expression of the "Idea.
Although Marx commends Hegel for he correctly identified the crucial conflict between interests of the civil society which is composed of private citizens and the universal interest of the state. Hegel formally thought that the interests of the king, executives, estates, and civil society, because of their interactions and mediation with each other, would be subsumed into the universal interest of the state. But for Marx, in reality, it is not the state and its legislation that created such law, it is rather the interest of the civil society, of the agricultural class and its institution of private property, that set the primogeniture right.
The primogeniture and perhaps most of the law even up to now is the abstract expression of private property on its very root, it is solely interest on its naked form. He shows the discrepancy between how sweetly political categories are being conceived and what is happening in actuality.
Philosophy of Right, I–II: Abstract Right and Morality
The fact is that, following Feuerbach, both religion and the concept of political state are mystification of the real human being. But unlike Feuerbach, Marx starts to move beyond from the pure human mind as the cause of the mystified phenomenon, and starts to point to the form of the material institutions and social agreement e. This account of Marx argument much favors the empiricist and reflective theory of knowledge side of him.
Although the text seems to be formless and eternally drudging, this can be excused as just a testament of the philosophical side of Marx, scholarly thinking through a painful Hegelian text. As a philosopher, he has already started to recognize the mystifications that appear not only in religion but also in the society. Jun 22, sologdin rated it it was ok Shelves: leftwing-theory , dilectio-sapientiae.
Facial hair care products are the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people. View all 8 comments. Shelves: philosophy. Having already spent four years in graduate school, I figured that I'd basically just have to do the minimal doctoral course requirements alongside this dissertation. It didn't work out that way. Although Loyola had the largest philosophy faculty in the country, there was only one professor really qualified to handle the psychological side of the work, Dr.
Richard Chessick. Furthermore, after twiddling their thumbs for a whole year, the advanced standing committee assigned to evaluate my records decided to grant me all doctoral course credit, but require the completion of all master's level coursework--that amounting to a lot more than I'd expected. Still, the die had been cast. I was a year along in the program, having taken what I thought I might need without their tardy guidance, and was determined to persist.
The next blow was the non-renewal of Chessick's contract. He also had an appointment at Northwestern University, so that was probably no great blow to him. It was, however, quite a loss for me and, arguably, for Loyola, now without anyone qualified the deal with the philosophical side of psychology, psychiatry and psychotherapeutics. Fortunately, my assistantship drawing to the end of its allowable period, I landed a job with the dean's office at the university's part-time division, a good job, and I let the original plan fade away, one course short of fulfilling requirements.
Then, a few years into a career as an academic administrator and now an assistant dean of the college, I decided that I wanted to teach as well, to become an adjunct professor. This meant finishing the PhD, or some PhD, my original inspiration having disappeared along with Chessick, the fellow I'd hoped would act as my advisor. So I started on a whole new project, one that would require the reading of the entire corpus of works by Marx and Engels, but one which would, I hoped, allow me to work with my favorite teacher, David Schweickart.
Some years previous I'd taken a political philosophy course with Dr. Schweickart, for which we'd read, among other things, Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Therefore this book seemed an appropriate thing to read while Hegel was still relatively fresh. Sep 18, Leonardo marked it as to-keep-reference. Jul 10, Berk Demir rated it it was amazing. Marx really worked on Hegel in detail and the result was perfect.
He developed his own ideas while preparing a crituque of Hegel. The introduction includes the famous "religion is the opium of the masses" sentence, but most importantly, you can see the development of the Marx especially in terms of private property. Jun 26, Aashish is currently reading it. Still reading. Dec 28, Johnny Kennedy rated it it was ok. Beautifully written Polemic, however, dangerous and propagates violence in a philosophy mislead by essentialist assumptions of human nature and a contradictory standpoint upon individual agency Marx emphasises his philosophy of action and Praxis and economic determinism Marx uses a deterministic analyses of religion in order to criticise it - failing to acknowledge religion as a product of the individual and can only see it as a product of society.
Jun 05, mimosa maoist added it Shelves: proletarian-literature. Like Poverty of Philosophy, this is like a warm-up run for the logical method worked out in the Introduction; but this is a lot harder to read. The Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Introduction sketches the critical role of philosophy as it is set in particular conditions in history, and as it addresses the crucial questions of its time that have opened for it has already liberated itself from its older problems.
Marx set philosophizing to be more radical, ad hominem , one that criticizes the root of the problem. By grappling the real problems, it at the same time aims to be transcended. For Marx, philosophy is The Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Introduction sketches the critical role of philosophy as it is set in particular conditions in history, and as it addresses the crucial questions of its time that have opened for it has already liberated itself from its older problems.
For Marx, philosophy is ready to abandon speculations; it is no longer a scalpel--a mere tool for observation and dissection--but a weapon: "it aims not to refute but to destroy. It is more pressing because, as Marx described the situation, it was set in the context where Germany had only nurtured her intellectual consciousness, and forgotten to participate and actualize it into practice. Although Germany's thinking equaled, perhaps even way advanced than its contemporary nation-state, her political conditions and actions peculiarly lagged behind. Marx saw that German thinking was already ripe for its new task.
It had already enlightened itself from the illusory problems and sufferings catered by religion, and now prepared to engage the real suffering. The imaginary flowers had already plucked out, and thinking was now set to criticize not the other-worldly illusions but of the untruths of the real world. The culmination of philosophy is its transcendence into actual, into practice. Marx identified the proletariat as the passive element, the material base of criticism's actuality.
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It is the class whose existence is materially produced by the industrialization. They are the complete opposite of the bourgeois class, and their interest is united with the majority, as they are principally burdened and suffering from the defects of the society. But Marx warned that revolution, the transcendence of philosophy, does not mean an utter negation of philosophy. The proletarian class needs to be awakened and enlightened, to carry and recognize the real sufferings, and sense such moment of enthusiasm to advance its main task.
This directs us to be more cautious in applying theoretical constructs. For there's no a-historical universally valid thinking, it is always spatio-temporal, historical, and thus the careful analysis of the historical conditions are prerequisite for guided actions, and also of theories. Perhaps, this explains the successive intellectual task Marx burdened himself, especially his theoretical analysis of capitalism.
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However, the details of philosophizing and how it can correctly grip the material base is the challenge to be addressed. How this abstract and intellectual labor, which perhaps for some ideological in character, can spring at the heart of the masses and be identified as an exact descriptions of their situation, without being artificially superimposed, or without being another form of illusory religion. Focusing on topics in metaphysics , epistemology , physics , ethics , history , religion , perception , consciousness , and political philosophy , it is where Hegel develops his concepts of dialectic including the master—slave dialectic , absolute idealism , ethical life , and Aufhebung.
It had a profound effect in Western philosophy , and "has been praised and blamed for the development of existentialism , communism , fascism , death of God theology , and historicist nihilism ". Hegel was putting the finishing touches to this book as Napoleon engaged Prussian troops on October 14, , in the Battle of Jena on a plateau outside the city. On the day before the battle, Napoleon entered the city of Jena. Later that same day Hegel wrote a letter to his friend the theologian Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer :. I saw the Emperor — this world-soul — riding out of the city on reconnaissance.
The Future of Hegel by Catherine Malabou | Issue 54 | Philosophy Now
It is indeed a wonderful sensation to see such an individual, who, concentrated here at a single point, astride a horse, reaches out over the world and masters it In Terry Pinkard notes that Hegel's comment to Niethammer "is all the more striking since at that point he had already composed the crucial section of the Phenomenology in which he remarked that the Revolution had now officially passed to another land Germany that would complete 'in thought' what the Revolution had only partially accomplished in practice.
The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences , in its third section Philosophy of Spirit , contains a second subsection The Encyclopedia Phenomenology that recounts in briefer and somewhat altered form the major themes of the original Phenomenology. The book consists of a Preface written after the rest was completed , an Introduction, and six major divisions of greatly varying size : " Consciousness ", " Self-Consciousness ", "Reason", "Spirit", "Religion", and " Absolute Knowledge ".
Most of these have further hierarchical subdivisions, and some versions of the book's table of contents also group the last four together as a single section on a level with the first two. Due to its obscure nature and the many works by Hegel that followed its publication, even the structure or core theme of the book itself remains contested. First, Hegel wrote the book under close time constraints with little chance for revision individual chapters were sent to the publisher before others were written.
Furthermore, according to some readers, Hegel may have changed his conception of the project over the course of the writing. Secondly, the book abounds with both highly technical argument in philosophical language, and concrete examples, either imaginary or historical, of developments by people through different states of consciousness. The relationship between these is disputed: whether Hegel meant to prove claims about the development of world history, or simply used it for illustration; whether or not the more conventionally philosophical passages are meant to address specific historical and philosophical positions; and so forth.
Jean Hyppolite famously interpreted the work as a Bildungsroman that follows the progression of its protagonist, Spirit, through the history of consciousness,  a characterization that remains prevalent among literary theorists. However, others contest this literary interpretation and instead read the work as a "self-conscious reflective account"  that a society must give of itself in order to understand itself and therefore become reflective.
The Preface to the text is a preamble to the scientific system and cognition in general. This involves an exposition on the content and standpoint of philosophy, i. The Hegelian method consists of actually examining consciousness' experience of both itself and of its objects and eliciting the contradictions and dynamic movement that come to light in looking at this experience. Hegel uses the phrase "pure looking at" reines Zusehen to describe this method. If consciousness just pays attention to what is actually present in itself and its relation to its objects, it will see that what looks like stable and fixed forms dissolve into a dialectical movement.
Thus, philosophy, according to Hegel, cannot just set out arguments based on a flow of deductive reasoning. Rather, it must look at actual consciousness, as it really exists. Hegel also argues strongly against the epistemological emphasis of modern philosophy from Descartes through Kant, which he describes as having to first establish the nature and criteria of knowledge prior to actually knowing anything, because this would imply an infinite regress , a foundationalism that Hegel maintains is self-contradictory and impossible.
Rather, he maintains, we must examine actual knowing as it occurs in real knowledge processes. This is why Hegel uses the term " phenomenology ". In Hegel's dynamic system, it is the study of the successive appearances of the mind to itself, because on examination each one dissolves into a later, more comprehensive and integrated form or structure of mind. Whereas the Preface was written after Hegel completed the Phenomenology , the Introduction was written beforehand.
It covers much of the same ground, but from a somewhat different perspective. In the Introduction, Hegel addresses the seeming paradox that we cannot evaluate our faculty of knowledge in terms of its ability to know the Absolute without first having a criterion for what the Absolute is, one that is superior to our knowledge of the Absolute.
Yet, we could only have such a criterion if we already had the improved knowledge that we seek. To resolve this paradox, Hegel adopts a method whereby the knowing that is characteristic of a particular stage of consciousness is evaluated using the criterion presupposed by consciousness itself. At each stage, consciousness knows something, and at the same time distinguishes the object of that knowledge as different from what it knows.